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Prosecuting Child Offenders: 
Factors Relevant to Rebutting 
the Presumption of Doli Incapax 
Thomas Crofts 
Abstract 
Despite existing since ancient times the presumption of doli incapax — that is, 
the presumption that children lack the moral and intellectual development to have 
the capacity to be guilty of crime — appears to be a relatively nebulous concept. 
Criticisms that the presumption is both over- and under-protective of children 
reveal diverse views and uncertainty about exactly how the presumption (and its 
legislative equivalents) does, and should, operate. This article takes the occasion 
of the recent High Court of Australia case of RP v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 
641 as a prompt to address this lack of clarity. It comprehensively reviews 
current case law to critically evaluate the sort of factors that have been used to 
establish that a child is sufficiently developed to be found criminally responsible. 
I Introduction 
The principle that children who commit wrongs should generally not be treated in 
the same way as adults has existed at common law in some form since ancient times. 
According, for example, to the Laws of King Aethelstan (925–35) a child under 
12 years of age was not to be punished under certain conditions, such as that they 
stole under a certain amount, or did not attempt to flee.1 Over time, presumably 
around the time Roman Law began to influence common law in the 12th and 13th 
centuries, this protection developed at common law into a presumption that children 
lack sufficient capacity to be guilty of a crime. This presumption broke down into 
an absolute presumption of criminal incapacity for children under seven years (often 
referred to as the minimum age of criminal responsibility) and a rebuttable 
presumption of criminal incapacity (doli incapax) for children from the age of seven 
until the age of 14. Once fixed the minimum age of criminal responsibility did not 
change until the mid- to late-20th century when it was raised to the age of 10 in 
England and Wales and throughout all Australian criminal jurisdictions.2 In contrast, 
 Professor of Criminal Law, University of Sydney Law School, Sydney Australia. 
1 ‘Laws of King Aethelstan (Council of Greatanlea)’ reproduced in Wiley B Sanders (ed), Juvenile 
Offenders for a Thousand Years: Selected Readings from Anglo-Saxon Times to 1900 (University of 
North Carolina Press, 1970) 3. For further discussion of the history of criminal responsibility of 
children, see A W G Kean, ‘The History of the Criminal Liability of Children’ (1937) 53(3) Law 
Quarterly Review 364; Thomas Crofts, The Criminal Responsibility of Children and Young Persons 
(Ashgate, 2002) 5–35. 
2 See Thomas Crofts, ‘The Common Law Influence over the Age of Criminal Responsibility — 
Australia’ (2016) 67(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 283. 
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the upper age level and rebuttable presumption of doli incapax have remained stable 
throughout Australia, applying now to children aged from the age of 10 until their 
14th birthday. Following much criticism, particularly in the wake of the Bulger case,3 
this rebuttable form of the presumption was abolished in England in 1998.4 
Given its long existence, it is perhaps not surprising that the presumption of 
doli incapax has, every so often, encountered a degree of criticism.5 Particularly over 
the last two decades there have been expressions of somewhat contradictory 
concerns in Australia that the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax is both over-
protective of children, by preventing them from being prosecuted, and under-
protective by being too easily rebutted.6 Views have also been expressed that the 
presumption is in need of abolition, reformulation or reversal.7 While noting some 
of these criticisms, but not addressing them in any detail, the High Court of Australia 
confirmed the value of the presumption in its 2016 decision of RP v The Queen.8 
The plurality judgment stated, in a measured and supportive tone: ‘In the case of an 
accused who is a child … it is not self-evident that the policy of the law is outmoded 
in requiring that the prosecution prove the child understood the moral wrongness of 
the conduct.’9 
This article does not revisit criticisms of the presumption or extensively 
evaluate the purpose of the presumption. It is sufficient to note that the presumption 
of doli incapax is one of the key gateways to young people entering the criminal 
justice system.10 It is based on the fundamental premise of criminal law that unless 
a person has the capacity to freely choose to do something they understand to be 
wrong they should not be liable to conviction and punishment in criminal 
                                                 
3 See, eg, Michael Freeman, ‘The James Bulger Tragedy: Childish Innocence and the Construction of 
Guilt’ in Anne McGillivray (ed), Governing Childhood (Dartmouth, 1997) 115. See also R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Venables and Thompson [1998] AC 407. 
4 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) s 34. For recent discussion see Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Protections 
for Children Before the Law: An Empirical Analysis of the Age of Criminal Responsibility, the 
Abolition of Doli Incapax and the Merits of a Developmental Immaturity Defence in England and 
Wales’ (2016) 16(4) Criminology & Criminal Justice 391. 
5 For instance, as early as 1883, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen criticised that ‘[l]ike most other 
presumptions of law, this rule is practically inoperative, or at all events operates seldom and 
capriciously’: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (Macmillan, 
1883) vol 2, 98. 
6 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, 
Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process, Report No 84 (1997) [18.19]. 
7 For recent criticism see, eg, GW v The Queen (2015) 20 DCLR (NSW) 236, 244–5 [41]–[46] (Lerve 
DCJ). For further discussion see Crofts, above n 2. 
8 (2016) 259 CLR 641. See also below n 10 regarding Recommendation 27.1 of the Royal Commission 
into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory. 
9 Ibid 650 [10] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ). 
10 Recently the Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern 
Territory (‘NT’) recommended that the minimum age level of criminal responsibility be raised to 12 
on the basis that this would reduce the number of children brought before the courts and it would 
better reflect current understanding of brain development: NT, Royal Commission into the Protection 
and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory, Final Report (2017) vol 2B, 420 
(Recommendation 27.1). The Commission also recommended retention of the rebuttable 
presumption of doli incapax for those aged 12–14: vol 2B, 417–18. 
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proceedings.11 It is normal that children lack this ability,12 but gradually develop it 
as they grow up. For this reason the law prevents prosecution of young children 
(under 10 years), but allows prosecution of older children where there is proof that 
they are developed enough to understand the wrongfulness of their behaviour. 
In RP v The Queen, the High Court faced the question of whether sufficient 
proof had been brought to rebut the presumption of doli incapax in a case involving 
a boy aged 11 and a half accused of committing sexual offences against his younger 
brother.13 In finding that there had not been sufficient proof, the Court made some 
important observations about the operation of the presumption which will be 
discussed alongside other relevant case law throughout this article. This article will 
reveal that the divergent views on the presumption of doli incapax do not necessarily 
represent deep differences in opinion about the value of the presumption. Instead, 
they are largely a product  of  the lack of clarity and coherency, despite the 
presumption’s longevity, over how the presumption should operate and what 
evidence should be sufficient to rebut it. Elucidating what the presumption requires 
and clarifying how it can be rebutted will help contextualise criticisms of the 
presumption. Furthermore, this will show that if appropriate attention is given to the 
function of the presumption and evidence necessary to rebut it, then it provides an 
appropriate mechanism for determining whether a child should be held criminally 
responsible. 
II What Needs to be Proved? 
The rebuttable presumption of doli incapax for children aged 10 but not yet 14 
remains a common law presumption in New South Wales (‘NSW’), South Australia 
and Victoria despite a 1997 recommendation that the presumption should be 
retained and placed on a statutory footing in all Australian jurisdictions.14 In all 
other jurisdictions, the presumption has been placed on a statutory footing.15 
Ancient laws, as already noted, generally provided an exemption from punishment 
for children, dependent on the circumstances of the act and the child’s behaviour, 
but they did not pronounce any broad test for when a child should not be punished. 
According to Sir Matthew Hale it was around the time of King Edward III (1327–77) 
11 See Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (London, 1736) vol 1, 14–15. For more 
contemporary views, see H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law (Oxford University Press, 1968) 218; Nicola Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: 
History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal Law Theory’ (2001) 64(3) Modern Law Review 
350, 353. 
12 Herein lies the difference to the defence of insanity where mental impairment is not something that 
every person experiences. As such it is an exception explaining why there is a presumption of sanity 
and why the burden is on the accused to establish that he or she lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature of the act and its wrongfulness.  
13 The appeal concerned two counts of sexual intercourse with an under 10-year-old.  
14 Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, 
above n 6, [18.20]. 
15 The presumption is legislatively embedded in all the ‘code’ criminal jurisdictions of Australia: 
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 26; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 (‘Criminal Code (Cth)’) s 7.2; 
Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) sch 1 (‘Criminal Code (NT)’) s 38(2); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) 
sch 1 (‘Criminal Code (Qld)’) s 29(2); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) sch 1 (‘Criminal Code (Tas)’) 
s 18(2); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) sch (‘Criminal Code (WA)’) s 29 para 2.  
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that ‘the Common law received a greater perfection, not by the change of the 
Common law, as some have thought …; but men grew to greater learning, judgment 
and experience’.16 Legal writers, such as Lambard (1581), Dalton (1619) and Hale 
(1736), referred to cases from that early period which articulated the presumption 
that children under 14 years could not be guilty of crime.17 These cases also 
expressed the basis upon which the presumption could be rebutted. Rebuttal required 
proof that the child could discern between, or had knowledge of, good and evil.18 
This was not a requirement of some abstract ability to discern good from evil, rather, 
it was linked to the ability to understand the wrongfulness of the actual offence 
committed. For instance, Dalton spoke of the child having ‘knowledge of good and 
evill, and of the perill and danger of that offence’.19 Similarly, Hale detailed cases 
that stated that the presumption of doli incapax could be rebutted by proof that the 
child ‘could discern between good and evil at the time of the offence committed’.20 
He also noted that to convict a child there must be evidence ‘to make it appear he 
understood what he did’.21 
The requirement that there be proof of ‘malicious intent’ or ‘malice’ can also 
be found in some cases in the 19th century.22 However, this did not require proof that 
the child had acted maliciously. Rather, the concern was whether the child knew that 
what he or she was doing was wrong. This was revealed by the case of R v Smith, in 
which ‘malicious intent’ was described as ‘a guilty knowledge that he was doing 
wrong’.23 Around the early 20th century there was further explanation of what sort 
of understanding was required to rebut the presumption. In 1919, it was said in R v 
Gorrie that there must be proof that the child had ‘mischievous discretion’,24 an 
expression that a commentator at the time found to be ‘certainly uncommon and one 
not often met with in ordinary parlance. But like many old English legal phrases it 
is wonderfully graphic and concise’.25 This necessitated that the prosecution ‘must 
satisfy the jury that when the boy did this he knew that he was doing what was wrong 
— not merely what was wrong, but what was gravely wrong, seriously wrong’.26 
In R v M, the question of the nature and degree of knowledge of wrongfulness 
that needed to be proved to rebut the presumption was addressed by the Supreme 
Court of South Australia.27 Chief Justice Bray explored whether this meant contrary 
to law or something else. His Honour noted that the term ‘knowledge of wrong’ was 
                                                 
16 Hale, above n 11, 24–5. 
17 Although there was some doubt for a period about whether the presumption of doli incapax applied 
from seven years to the age of 12 or to the age of 14: see Kean, above n 1, 368; Crofts, above n 1, 9. 
Some early authors also divided this age into seven to under 12, and 12 to under 14: see, eg, Hale, 
above n 11, 26–8. A similar approach can be found in Roman Law (distinguishing infantes, 
impuberes infantiae proximi and impuberes pubertati proximi): see Crofts, above n 1, 94.  
18 William Lambarde, Eirenarcha: or, of the Office of the Justices of Peace (London, 1581) 218; 
Michael Dalton, The Countrey Justice (London, 1618) 223–4; Hale, above n 11, 24–8. 
19 Dalton, above n 18, 223–4. 
20 Hale, above n 11, 26. 
21 Ibid 27. 
22 See, eg, R v Vamlew (1862) 176 ER 234; R v Smith (1845) 1 Cox CC 260; R v Owen (1830) 172 ER 685. 
23 (1845) 1 Cox CC 260 (Erle J). See also R v Owen (1830) 172 ER 685. 
24 R v Gorrie (1919) 83 JP 136, 136 (Salter J). 
25 Commentary, ‘R v Gorrie’ (1919) 83 Justice of the Peace Journal 307. 
26 R v Gorrie (1919) 83 JP 136 (Salter J). 
27 (1977) 16 SASR 589. 
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familiar from the ‘M’Naghten Rules’ in relation to insanity.28 Chief Justice Bray 
found that while in England the term had been interpreted as knowledge that the act 
was against the law,29 the High Court of Australia had interpreted the test as 
knowledge that the act was wrong according to the ordinary standards of reasonable 
men.30 His Honour found no reason not to interpret this phrase in the same way in 
relation to children.31 In explaining this further, Bray CJ deprecated the use of the 
term ‘understanding that it was something that adults would disapprove of’ because 
‘[a]dults frequently disapprove of breaches of decorum and good manners on the 
part of children and of their lack of diligence or tidiness without regarding the acts 
or omissions in question as wrong in the relevant sense.’32 More recently, the 
Supreme Court of the ACT confirmed this view, stating in R v JA that it is: ‘not 
sufficient that the child knows that there would be “disapproval” of the act by a 
parent or even police’.33 
A question that also arose in R v M was whether the trial judge’s direction to 
the jury ‘lacked sufficient intensity’ because it referred only to proof that the child 
had knowledge of right and wrong, not knowledge that the act was ‘gravely wrong, 
seriously wrong’ as in Gorrie.34 It was held that there was no authority to the effect 
that not using the adverbs ‘gravely or seriously’ would amount to a misdirection.35 
Nonetheless, understanding that the behaviour was ‘seriously wrong’ has become 
the standard formulation of what the prosecution must establish to rebut the 
presumption in Australia (and in England and Wales before it was abolished). 
There was some criticism in the English case C (A Minor) v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (‘C v DPP’) that the term ‘seriously wrong’ is conceptually 
obscure.36 On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Lowry concluded, however, that 
its meaning is relatively clear when contrasted with mere naughtiness or 
mischievousness.37 This distinction was also adopted in a number of Australian 
decisions that required proof that the child ‘knew it was seriously wrong, as distinct 
from an act of mere naughtiness or mischief’.38 The High Court in RP v The Queen 
confirmed the approach, noting that aside from establishing that the child knew that 
the offence was seriously wrong in a moral sense, there was ‘the further dimension 
of proof of knowledge of serious wrongness as distinct from mere naughtiness’.39 
                                                 
28 R v McNaghten (1843) 8 ER 718. This case established that the defence of insanity applies when a 
person, at the time of the act, ‘was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong’: at 722. 
29 R v Windle [1952] 2 QB 826. 
30 Stapleton v The Queen (1952) 86 CLR 358. 
31 R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589, 591. See also R (A Child) v Whitty (1993) 66 A Crim R 462; R v JA 
(2007) 161 ACTR 1.  
32 R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589, 591. 
33 (2007) 161 ACTR 1, 11 [69]. 
34 (1977) 16 SASR 589, 593. 
35 Ibid. 
36 [1995] 1 Cr App R 118. This was one of the reasons Laws J found that the presumption of doli 
incapax was a disservice to the law of England: at 125–6. 
37 C (A Minor) v DPP [1996] AC 1, 22. 
38 BP v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 172 (1 June 2006) [27]. See also RP v The Queen (2016) 259 
CLR 641; R v JA (2007) 161 ACTR 1; R v ALH (2003) 6 VR 276; R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589. 
39 (2016) 259 CLR 641, 650 [11]. 
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There has been some criticism of making the contrast between understanding 
that the behaviour was seriously wrong as opposed to merely naughty. In the NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal decision in RP v The Queen, Hamill J found this contrast 
to be 
unhelpful and, in jury directions, could give rise to an erroneous process of 
reasoning whereby a finding that the act was more than naughty or 
mischievous may lead to a finding that the child knew that what they did was 
seriously or gravely wrong without proper attention being paid to that 
question. There is a vast chasm between something that is ‘naughty’ or 
‘mischievous’ and something that is gravely or seriously wrong. The trouble 
with introducing the comparison is that it is easy to fall into the trap of 
thinking that if something is more than naughty, it must therefore satisfy the 
test. It does not.40 
There is some weight in this criticism, however, the formulation is useful. In 
making the contrast, the courts are aiming to explain, in clear terms, what sort of 
understanding the child must have in order to rebut the presumption. The term 
‘seriously’ wrong does not mean that the offence itself must be one of a serious 
nature.41 Rather, the term serious relates to the nature and degree of the child’s 
understanding. What the court is looking for is that the child knows that what they 
have done is not just something naughty that will be dealt with in the home or at school, 
but rather something that is so wrong, hence use of the term seriously wrong, that it 
will be dealt with outside the home. When explaining the concept of seriously wrong 
Lord Goodhart spoke about the child understanding the criminality of the act.42 His 
Lordship pointed out that a child may develop from very early on a concept of right 
and wrong, in the sense that the child learns that it is wrong to throw porridge on the 
floor if he or she does not want to eat it, or that it is wrong to grab a sibling’s favourite 
toy and make them cry. However, this understanding of wrongfulness is more of an 
appreciation of the naughtiness of the behaviour and is not sufficient to make the child 
criminally responsible. The child must have an understanding of the criminality of the 
act, in the sense that he or she knows ‘the difference between doing things which are 
naughty and for which you will be punished (it is to be hoped) by a parent, and doing 
things which are seriously wrong and liable to punishment by a court’.43 
The statutory equivalents to the common law presumption of doli incapax 
vary from each other and the common law. The Criminal Codes of the Australian 
Capital Territory and the Commonwealth are worded in a similar way to the common 
law, both providing that a child aged 10 but not yet 14 ‘can only be criminally 
responsible for an offence if the child knows that his or her conduct is wrong’.44  
In contrast, the Criminal Codes of the Northern Territory (‘NT’), Queensland, 
                                                 
40 RP v the Queen (2015) 90 NSWLR 234, 256 [129]. 
41 As such the criticism in Glanville Williams, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Children’ [1954] 
Criminal Law Review 493, 496, that ‘[i]t seems absurd to say that a child who indulges in a series of 
annoying peccadilloes can set the magistrates at defiance, for the reason that none of his acts is 
gravely wrong’, is misplaced. 
42 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 19 March 1998, vol 587, col 830 (Lord 
Goodhart). 
43 Ibid. For a discussion of similar issues in relation to the competency of a child to testify, see R v GW 
(2016) 258 CLR 108. 
44 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 26(1); Criminal Code (Cth) s 7.2(1). 
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Tasmania and Western Australia, refer to a child under the age of 14 not being 
criminally responsible ‘unless it is proved that at the time of doing the act or making 
the omission the person had capacity to know that the person ought not to do the act 
or make the omission’.45 It does not, however, appear that Sir Samuel Griffith when 
drafting the Criminal Code of Queensland, on which the Criminal Codes of Western 
Australia, Tasmania and, to a lesser extent, the NT are all based, thought he was doing 
anything other than codifying the common law in relation to infancy. In his Draft 
Code, which details the source of his draft provisions, Griffith noted that the basis of 
s 31 (which then became s 29) is the common law.46 There is no suggestion from 
other sources cited that Griffith intended to deviate from the common law position. 
Different views have, however, been expressed in the courts of these 
jurisdictions about whether these provisions merely represent a codified form of the 
common law presumption and are thus to be interpreted in the same way, or whether 
something different is required. In R v B, Pincus JA took the view that the 
Queensland provision required something different from the common law 
presumption.47 His Honour noted that: 
We were referred to authorities which would if applied, attribute to the 
subsection which I have quoted a rather different meaning from that which its 
language appears to convey. For example, reference was made to B v R (1958) 
44 Cr App R, an English case, in which speaking of an accused between the 
ages of 8 and 14 it was said that in order to rebut the presumption in favour of 
such a child ‘guilty knowledge must be proved and the evidence to that effect 
must be clear and beyond all possibility of doubt’. It is plain that this is not 
the law of Queensland. What the Code requires could hardly be more clearly 
stated: it must be proved that at the relevant time ‘the person had capacity’ (I 
emphasise capacity) ‘to know that the person ought not to do the act’. This is, 
of course, different from proving actual knowledge.48 
This approach could mean that it is easier to establish criminal responsibility in the 
traditional Code states, because there need only be proof that the child had the 
capacity to know that what he or she was doing was wrong at the time of the offence, 
regardless of whether he or she actually knew this. 
In contrast, a number of other cases take the view that the Code provisions 
are restatements of the common law and thus, despite different wording, require the 
same proof. In the earlier Queensland case R v B, DM Campbell J noted that at 
common law there is a rebuttable presumption of doli incapax and that this 
presumption is expressed in s 29 of the Criminal Code (Qld).49 Likewise, WB 
Campbell J cited common law sources as authorities on what must be established to 
                                                 
45 Criminal Code (Qld) s 29(2). See also Criminal Code (NT) s 38(2); Criminal Code (WA) s 29  
para 2. The Criminal Code (Tas) s 18(2) refers to sufficient capacity to know. 
46 Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, Draft of a Code of Criminal Law (29 October 1897) <http://ozcase. 
library.qut.edu.au/qhlc/documents/GRIFFCC_Draft_1897.pdf>.  
47 [1997] QCA 486 (6 November 1997). See also R v F, ex parte A-G (Qld) (1999) 2 Qd R 157, where 
it was found that the trial judge had applied an erroneous test by requiring evidence that the child 
understood what he did rather than had the capacity to know. 
48 R v B [1997] QCA 486 (6 November 1997). 
49 [1979] Qd R 417, 421. 
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rebut the presumption.50 The same approach can be found in Tasmania, where 
Neasey J stated in M v J that: ‘The subsection [s 18(2)] re-enacts the common law 
requirement usually stated in terms of presumptions concerning children under the 
age of 14 years.’51 His Honour went on to cite common law references and while 
noting that s 18(2) makes some changes to the common law rule in referring to the 
child having ‘sufficient capacity’ rather than knowledge, he continued: ‘I think the 
subsection was intended to reproduce the common law rule which equates capacity 
to know with actually knowing.’52 Justice Neasey also commented that the similar 
provision in Queensland has also been interpreted in line with the common law. 
Similarly, in the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, R v T, Fitzgerald P 
noted that the issue under s 29 of the Code was whether the appellant had the 
capacity to know that he ought not to ‘flick’ his lighted cigarette onto the paper under 
the counter.53 However, his Honour’s conclusion on the matter referred to 
knowledge rather than capacity: ‘It is difficult to comprehend any basis for a 
submission that the appellant might not have known that it was wrong to “flick” a 
lighted cigarette onto paper in a shop … and he would certainly have known that it 
was wrong to set fire to the shop.’54 Because of the tendency to treat the common 
law and Code requirements as indistinct, the following discussion will proceed on 
the basis of the need for proof of actual knowledge. Having clarified the law relating 
to the presumption, the following Part will evaluate the types of evidence that have 
been used to rebut the presumption of doli incapax. 
III Evidence Rebutting the Presumption 
It is important to note that the presumption of doli incapax (and its statutory 
equivalents) is not a defence in the sense that it must neither be raised nor proven by 
the accused. Since early times, it has been established that the burden of rebutting 
the presumption is on the prosecution.55 Accordingly, the prosecution must bring 
evidence to rebut the presumption alongside proof of all elements of the offence. It 
must do so with ‘very strong and pregnant evidence’;56 that is, to the criminal 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt.57 In R v ALH, Cummins AJA took the view 
that the prosecution should prove that a child understood that the act was seriously 
wrong as part of the mental element of the offence.58 There is a danger that such a 
formulation can lead to confusion and the idea that establishing any required mens 
                                                 
50 Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 10 (3rd ed) Criminal Law and Procedure, ‘1 Principles 
of Criminal Liability’ [528], cited in R v B [1979] Qd R 417, 425; B v The Queen [1958] 44 Cr App 
R 1, 3, quoted in R v B [1979] Qd R 417, 425. 
51 [1989] Tas R 212, 221. 
52 Ibid 222. 
53 [1997] 1 Qd R 623, 626. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See, eg, Hale, above n 11, 27. See also Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 26(3); Criminal Code (Cth) 
s 7.2(2), which specify that the burden of proving that the child knows that the conduct was wrong is 
on the prosecution. 
56 Hale, above n 11, 27.  
57 AL v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 34 (22 March 2017) [120]; RP v The Queen (2015) 90 NSWLR 
234, 238 [19]; R v JA (2007) 161 ACTR 1, 6 [32], 12 [82]; C (A Minor) v DPP [1996] AC 1, 29; B v 
The Queen [1958] 44 Cr App R 1, 3–4. 
58 (2003) 6 VR 276, 295 [75]. 
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rea or mental element is the same thing as establishing that a child understood the 
behaviour to be seriously wrong. In reality, these are distinct concepts: being able to 
understand that an act is seriously wrong is different from forming a mental element 
in relation to the act. As correctly stated by Higgins CJ in R v JA, the decision by 
Cummins AJA ‘should not, however, be taken to establish that proof of the voluntary 
and intentional commission of the acts charged will constitute prima facie evidence 
of doli capax’.59 
A Age 
It has been said, in many cases, that the closer the child is to 14 years — the age at 
which all children are assumed to have the capacity to be criminally responsible — 
the easier it will be to rebut the presumption.60 This approach may, at first glance, 
appear to make sense. However, it has correctly been criticised by the High Court in 
RP v The Queen because it is ‘apt to suggest that children mature at a uniform rate’.61 
The whole reason for a rebuttable presumption, rather than a blanket assumption of 
incapacity, is because it is well-established in research that children in this age period 
develop at different and inconsistent rates.62 This was acknowledged by Blackstone 
in 1769, when he commented that: ‘the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is 
not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s 
understanding and judgment’.63 Provided that these concerns are kept in mind and 
the age of the child is not approached rigidly, it is appropriate to treat it as a starting 
point, indicating how much further evidence may be needed. While being close to 
14 years old might suggest that little evidence would be needed to confirm that the 
child had the requisite understanding, other factors (such as the type of offence, 
evidence of a low IQ, and so on) may indicate that it is not correct to make this 
assumption. 
B Offence Committed 
Similarly, in many cases it has been stated that the more obviously wrong the act, 
the easier it is to rebut the presumption.64 Clearly, some acts are more obviously 
wrong than others and so the offence committed may be indicative of how much 
further evidence is needed. Children gradually develop an understanding of the 
wrongfulness of acts, depending on the age at which, and how, the child comes into 
contact with the norm forbidding the behaviour. They are more likely to understand 
the seriousness of offences that reflect values of which they have direct personal 
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experience, or which are commonly discussed or modelled in the home or at 
school.65 Some acts may also be more easily aligned with naughtiness, such as 
throwing stones and causing damage, or mischief that has turned to vandalism.66 In 
contrast, acts of dishonesty, such as stealing, may be more likely to be understood 
to be seriously wrong.67 But it is also not that simple, because a child may less easily 
understand the wrongfulness of acts of dishonesty that are based on complex social 
relations, such as forgery or fraud. As pointed out by Donaldson LJ in the case of 
JBH (A Minor) v O’Connell: ‘if, for example, children between the ages of 10 and 
14 were charged with forgery, it might require a considerable body of evidence 
before magistrates were satisfied that they knew that what they were doing was 
wrong’.68 It is clear, then, that the starting point is the type of offence committed and 
the type of interest that it protects, rather than whether the offence itself is serious or 
not. The statement by Lord Lowry in C (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions 
that the ‘more obviously heinous’69 the offence, the easier it will be to rebut the 
presumption, is therefore problematic. A child’s understanding of wrongfulness is 
not inexorably related to the seriousness or heinousness of the offence.70 
An important point to remember here is that it has long been held that the 
child’s knowledge ‘must be proved by the evidence, and cannot be presumed from 
the mere commission of the act’.71 Not allowing proof of the acts that comprise the 
offence alone to rebut the presumption is designed to stop the prosecution and the 
court from simply inferring that the child understood the wrongfulness of the act as 
an adult would have done in the circumstances.72 The correctness of this approach 
was questioned in R v ALH, where Callaway JA commented that authorities 
suggesting that the acts constituting the offence cannot alone be drawn on to prove 
understanding ‘are wrong in principle and should not be followed’.73 Similarly, 
Cummins AJA felt that some acts are so ‘serious, harmful or wrong’ that they 
establish the required understanding, while others are less obvious and so may be 
equivocal or insufficient to establish the understanding.74 His Honour therefore took 
the view that, provided adult judgments are not attributed to children, ‘there is no 
reason in logic or experience why the proof of the act charged is not capable of 
proving requisite knowledge’.75 The danger with this approach, as with age 
(discussed above in Part IIIA), is that it becomes objective or nomothetic, with the 
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focus on generalised assumptions about what children should understand (often 
based on common sense claims, often from an adult perspective), rather than paying 
attention to the understanding of the actual child in question and what factors may 
affect that child’s ability in the concrete circumstances of the crime. 
There are several cases where the prosecution had not gathered any or much 
evidence that went beyond that which established the commission of the offence 
itself.76 This approach appears to have been a particular problem in the case of RP 
v The Queen where the majority of the High Court noted that aside from inferences 
drawn from the circumstances of the offence, the only evidence adduced was a Job 
Capacity Assessment Report and a clinical psychologist’s report (issued when RP 
was 17 and 18 respectively and neither in relation to these charges).77 Both reports 
showed that RP was in the borderline range of intellectual functioning, yet despite 
this, the prosecution brought no further evidence. Perhaps one of the most 
significant aspects of RP v The Queen is therefore the subtle, yet pointed, comment 
that the prosecution’s submissions were ‘apt to overlook’ the fact that the starting 
point is the presumption that children lack sufficient intellectual and moral 
development to be found doli capax.78 This is a reminder that the onus is placed 
squarely on the prosecution to bring evidence to rebut that presumption to the 
criminal standard and that it would subvert the presumption if the prosecution did 
not bring adequate evidence. 
This bar on allowing the presumption to be rebutted by inferences only from 
evidence establishing the offence seems to be largely responsible for the 
diametrically opposed criticisms of the presumption of doli incapax. According to 
van Krieken, those cases that apply the presumption strictly and require evidence 
beyond that proving commission of the wrongful acts (‘high hurdle’ cases) are the 
ones where courts have been most critical of the presumption of doli incapax.79 This 
is particularly so where courts feel that the act was so evidently wrong that every 
child should know this and therefore that there should be no, or little, need for extra 
evidence to establish understanding. Such criticisms align with the view that the 
presumption is over-protective, by standing in the way of prosecuting children. In 
contrast, van Krieken argues that in those cases where the rule is approached less 
strictly (‘low hurdle’ cases), there is less criticism of the operation of the 
presumption by the courts.80 However, cases where the presumption has been 
rebutted based on generalisations and inferences from the evidence establishing the 
offence have also led to arguments that the presumption provides little or 
inconsistent protection for children. To some extent, the decision in RP v The Queen 
should bring some clarity here by confirming the correctness of the former approach: 
‘No matter how obviously wrong the act or acts constituting the offence may be, the 
presumption cannot be rebutted merely as an inference from the doing of that act or 
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those acts.’81 Settling on this approach could leave open criticisms about the 
difficulty of rebutting the presumption. The remainder of Part III therefore aims to 
allay such criticism by bringing greater clarity to the types of evidence that are 
appropriate to rebut the presumption. 
C Circumstances Surrounding the Act 
While the evidence establishing the offence itself cannot alone be used to rebut the 
presumption it is widely accepted that evidence of the circumstances surrounding 
the offence can be called on.82 The sort of evidence of surrounding circumstances 
which has been used to support a finding that the child understood that what he or 
she had done was seriously wrong includes: evidence of careful planning of the 
crime, particularly sophisticated or devious methods of carrying out the act; assertion 
of a false alibi; making efforts to conceal the act or divert blame;, and running away 
from police.83 In R v Sheldon, an almost 14-year-old boy told his 10-year-old cousin 
that he knew a place where people were making a sundial in order to lure her to a 
secluded place.84 Once there, he attacked her, made her unconscious by squeezing 
her neck and then sexually assaulted her. Following the attack, he returned to his 
friends looking distressed and telling them he had found a body, which he then 
showed them before calling emergency services. When later accused of committing 
these acts, he denied them, maintaining that he found his cousin laying there by 
chance, and also gave a description of someone he claimed to have seen running 
away from the scene. The conduct of the boy leading up to the act, ‘the relatively 
sophisticated subterfuge practised by the appellant to lure [his cousin] Joanne to the 
scene’,85 and his behaviour after the act were thought to clearly indicate that he 
understood that his act was seriously wrong. 
Running away from the police has also been accepted in several cases as 
proof of an appreciation that the act was seriously wrong.86 As noted by Lord Lowry 
in C (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions, there may be cases ‘where running 
away would indicate guilty knowledge, where an act is either wrong or innocent and 
there is no room for mere naughtiness. An example might be selling drugs at a street 
corner and fleeing at the sight of a policeman.’87 However, it has also been noted 
that children may well run away just because they think they have done something 
naughty or, indeed, simply because they are afraid of the police.88 The context of 
running away is therefore important.89 
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The type of place where an offence was committed and the manner in which 
it was committed may also indicate understanding of wrongfulness. In RH v Director 
of Public Prosecutions (NSW),90 a 12-year-old child forcibly broke into a fire station 
with the use of a jemmy, ‘ransacked’ it, and stole some items. It was argued by the 
defence that because these matters merely proved the acts that constituted the 
offence, they could not be taken into account, as established in C v DPP.91 Hoeben 
CJ at CL disagreed and stated: 
The importance of the object of the break-in being a fire station was that it 
would have been appreciated by the plaintiff that the fire station existed for a 
specific purpose and that he was not meant to be there. That he was aware of 
this fact, emerges from statements which he made to CK [his cousin]. Of more 
significance is the use of a jemmy to break open the padlock. … This was an 
obviously wrongful act which required some planning, ie, having a jemmy 
available.92 
In reaching this conclusion Hoeben CJ at CL noted that there had been conflicting 
views in earlier cases about whether evidence establishing the offence itself could 
be sufficient to rebut the presumption. His Honour took the view that according to 
C v DPP, such evidence could be used as long as it was not the only evidence used.93 
His Honour went further and suggested, in agreement with Hodgson JA in BP v The 
Queen, that the Court should not take a narrow view of the sort of circumstances that 
could be taken into account.94 In BP v The Queen, evidence that the victim was 
crying, screaming, and struggling while BP digitally penetrated her and the fact that 
he asked SW, who was also present, to stop the victim crying (which he did by 
placing his hand over her mouth) were held to be circumstances surrounding the 
offence that could be taken into account to establish both boys understood that what 
they were doing was seriously wrong.95 Similarly, in A v Director of Public 
Prosecutions,96 a 12-year-old boy and another child took a girl to the chute room in 
a block of flats and forced her to commit sexual acts under threats of violence. Upon 
hearing adults outside on the landing, the boys fled. The Court found that the threats, 
the obviousness of the victim’s distress, taking the girl to a place where detection 
was unlikely, and running away on the appearance of adults were all factors which, 
although closely associated with the act, could be used to indicate an understanding 
of the seriousness of the act.97 
In RP v The Queen, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal also took the view 
that factors, similar to those in BP v The Queen and A v DPP such as placing a hand 
over the mouth of the victim, and the victim crying and being in evident distress, did 
establish that he understood that he was doing something seriously wrong.98 
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However, the High Court disagreed and held that, in the face of the available 
evidence about the boy’s mental development, the circumstances of the offence did 
not show that he understood the moral wrongfulness of his actions.99 The Court 
noted that it is common for children to engage in sexual play and want to keep this 
secret because they think it is naughty. Even though in this case RP’s behaviour went 
far beyond ordinary experimentation, the Court opined that this, on its own, did not 
lead to ‘a conclusion that he understood his conduct was seriously wrong in a moral 
sense, as distinct from it being rude or naughty’.100 The Court took the view that it 
could not be assumed that a child aged 11 and a half years ‘understands that the 
infliction of hurt and distress on a younger sibling involves serious wrongdoing’.101 
Similarly, RP placing his hand over the mouth of his brother to silence him and thus 
avoid detection was found to be ‘equally consistent with naughtiness or wrong 
behaviour short of being seriously or gravely wrong’.102 
More recently, in AL v The Queen, a boy aged between 12 and 13 sexually 
assaulted on several occasions a boy aged between 4 and 5 years old.103 The offences, 
which involved the victim being forced to fellate AL, took place while the victim 
was visiting the house of AL. Factors introduced to indicate that AL understood that 
his acts were seriously wrong were that AL took steps to avoid detection similar to 
those discussed in the above cases, such as: making threats to ensure silence; taking 
the victim to the bathroom and locking the door; and ensuring the victim was 
composed before he could return to his siblings.104 The NSW Court of Criminal 
Appeal rejected the defence’s argument that the jury should have been warned of the 
‘significant shortcomings’ in drawing conclusions from the circumstances 
surrounding the act,105 as was found to be the case in RP v The Queen. The Court 
noted that RP v The Queen turned on its facts, and a significant factor in that case 
was that the inferences made from the evidence of circumstances surrounding the 
act needed to be weighed against evidence showing that RP was in the borderline 
range of intellectual disability, which was not the case in AL.106 
The use of the condom by RP when he penetrated his brother was also found 
by the plurality of the High Court to be a significant factor indicating a lack of 
understanding. The trial judge and Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in 
disregarding this evidence.107 The plurality held that 
[t]he fact that a child of 11 years and six months knew about anal intercourse, 
and to use a condom when engaging in it, was strongly suggestive of his 
exposure to inappropriate sexually explicit material or of having been himself 
the subject of sexual interference ...108 
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Such experiences could significantly affect the ability of the boy to understand the 
moral wrongfulness of the act. While not necessarily disagreeing with this premise, 
Gageler J found that it was right to set the evidence aside because: ‘Without greater 
context, I do not think that use of a condom alone suggests that RP had been exposed 
to influences that impeded the development of his capacity to tell right from 
wrong.’109 
The mode of committing the offence and level of involvement in the 
commission of the offence can also be indicative of whether a child understood its 
wrongfulness. For instance, it may be easier to understand the wrongfulness of an 
offence committed by positive action, rather than by omission. Similarly, a child 
participant in the offence of another may be less aware of the wrongfulness than a 
child who acts alone or who initiates the offence. Bandalli highlights this point using 
the case of C (A Minor) v DPP:110 
Holding handlebars [of a motorbike] whilst watching someone else cause 
damage [by forcing the motorbike lock using a crowbar] could well be 
regarded as just naughty or even as non-involvement by anyone, especially a 
child, unacquainted with the principles of secondary participation.111 
In sum, it should be remembered that generalisations only serve as a starting 
point and that the inquiry is whether the actual child understood the wrongfulness of 
the particular act at the time and in the circumstances in which it was committed. 
Whether a child had the required understanding is dependent on many varied factors, 
including developmental factors.112 As Gageler J pointed out in RP v The Queen, 
inferences drawn from the circumstances surrounding the act alone need to be placed 
in the context of other evidence about the child’s mental capacity.113 Given the 
difficulty in separating evidence that establishes the commission of the offence from 
evidence of circumstances surrounding the offence, and the importance of context, 
the best approach is to adduce further forms of evidence which can confirm any 
conclusions drawn from such evidence. 
D Evidence of Normality 
As already noted, some offences may be regarded as so obviously wrong that every 
child is taken to understand their wrongfulness. However, it is quite clear that this 
does not mean that the prosecution can disregard the presumption and not lead any 
evidence. In R v LAH, the prosecution relied on the argument that ‘[i]t was inevitable 
… that the jury would have concluded that, in 1999, the 13 year old appellant who 
appeared of normal intelligence and attended school, would have the capacity to 
know he should not behave in this way’.114 While the Queensland Court of Criminal 
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Appeal found some appeal in this approach, it concluded that this is not in line with 
the clear wording of s 29(2) of the Criminal Code of Queensland.115 As stated in 
R v B:  
One would expect a child as old as 12 to have the capacity to know that 
threatening a teacher with a knife is wrong, but this expectation does not affect 
the existence of the presumption; it only affects the strength of the evidence 
likely to be necessary to rebut it.116  
Thus, the comment by Cummins AJA in R v ALH that some acts are so obviously 
wrong that a child will understand their wrongfulness at an early age,117 is 
problematic. While it may be thought that the offence is so obviously wrong that all 
children should understand this from an early age there may be factors — such as 
the child’s mental capacity, background or the context in which the act is committed 
— that may mean that this particular child did not understand the wrongfulness at 
the time of acting. Lennings and Lennings criticise a nomothetic approach rather 
than a personal approach to assessing the child’s understanding and highlight the 
difference between decision-making in ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ conditions. They comment 
that 
[i]n hot conditions, where there is high emotional stimulation, adolescent 
immaturity becomes more pronounced. In hot conditions, the impact of 
developmental delays and vulnerabilities are stark and exert a significant 
impact on the maturity of decision-making. Tests of whether an action is 
seriously wrong must therefore require an understanding of the context in 
which the action took place (in the case of criminal offending, a hot condition 
mostly) as opposed to some nomothetic understanding of what is possible for 
young people to decide.118 
To avoid the preclusion on using proof of the acts constituting the offence, 
some decisions have adopted the presumption of normality. Although this 
terminology stems from English cases and is not used in Australian cases, the logic 
underlying the presumption of normality has been applied in Australia. It functions 
in this way: the act is assumed to be so obviously seriously wrong that any normal 
child between the age of 10 and 14 would have known this; so, if there is proof that 
the child is normal, the child is presumed to have the requisite knowledge. JBH  
(A Minor) v O’Connell confirmed the operation of the presumption of normality 
provided that there was evidence that the ‘children were ordinary children with 
ordinary mental aptitudes’, as opposed to a mere assumption that the children were 
normal.119 Similarly, in RH v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) Hoeben CJ at 
CL held that the trial judge should not have assumed that the child was a normal 
12-year-old without any evidence confirming this. However, his Honour then 
continued by saying that there was no need for a lot of evidence for the Court to be 
able to draw such an inference. His Honour noted that: ‘Evidence from the plaintiff’s 
mother concerning his performance at school or his behaviour generally, would have 
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been sufficient.’120 Evidence establishing that a child is ‘normally’ developed will 
often come from statements by teachers and school reports,121 but may also include 
things such as an analysis of the child’s handwriting.122 In contrast, a simple 
assumption that the child was normally developed on the basis of the child’s physical 
appearance is not sufficient.123 
It is understandable that the prosecution may consider the need to bring 
evidence of understanding to be inconvenient where the offence appears to be 
obviously seriously wrong. Nonetheless, an approach that assumes the child’s 
normality is problematic. The most obvious objection is that there is no examination 
of the child’s actual state of mind in relation to the specific act committed. Rather, 
there is reliance on assumptions about what children might generally understand, 
backed up by evidence of the child’s normal development. It is vital to remember 
that the test is ‘a subjective one and concerned the state of mind of the particular 
minor. It could not be applied on the basis of what a normal child of 12 would have 
known or thought.’124 An even more fundamental objection to this approach is that 
using such evidence is incompatible with the presumption. It is illogical to allow 
evidence of normality to rebut a presumption that is based on the premise that 
children aged between 10 and 14 generally do not understand the wrongfulness of 
their actions. Proof of normality should actually confirm a lack of understanding, 
rather than be taken to prove the opposite. 
E Expert Evidence 
It is possible, but not necessary, to call an expert witness to give evidence on the 
child’s developmental state. This may take the form of a report by a psychologist or 
psychiatrist. Two factors that must be kept in mind when relying on reports are: what 
was the report produced for and when was it produced? Unless specifically prepared 
for the court, such evidence may only indicate a general level of understanding or 
typical behaviour and not whether the child actually understood that what he or she 
was doing was wrong at the time and in the circumstances of the offence. In RP v 
The Queen, for example, a Job Capacity Assessment and clinical psychologist’s 
report were relied on by the prosecution, even though neither were prepared for the 
proceedings.125 
Even where the report is specifically prepared for the court, a significant 
delay can severely compromise its accuracy and usefulness. In R v LMW, the 
psychiatrist’s report was rejected because it was based on an interview with LMW 
that took place 19 months after the incident.126 The Court commented that 
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[i]n that period not only had the accused grown older but much more 
importantly he had undergone very unhappy experiences resulting from the 
death of the deceased. He had experienced threats from those who obviously 
believed he was responsible for what had occurred, he had undergone the 
ordeal of proceedings in the Children’s Court and he had been subject to much 
attention by the media.127 
An important question is whether expert testimony about the capacity of the 
child should be allowed or even required in every case. The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern about youth justice 
systems that require a positive finding that the child was criminally responsible, yet 
do not demand evidence from an expert, such as a psychologist.128 The potential 
benefit of such evidence in some cases must, however, be weighed against the 
negative impact of routinely requiring expert testimony. There are practical 
considerations of the cost, availability, and expertise of the expert witness. The 
preparation of a report has the potential to prolong proceedings,129 which can impact 
negatively on the child,130 or, as noted in R v LMW, be of limited utility because a 
child’s understanding may change after the event.131 
Expert testimony is called on the basis that this can provide specialist 
knowledge that the magistrate, judge or jury does not possess.132 If there is a view 
that such evidence is routinely needed because the court does not have the requisite 
skills, there is the danger that the judge, magistrate, or jury ‘will abdicate their duty 
to ascertain and weigh the facts and simply accept the experts’ own opinion 
evidence’.133 Such a view was expressed in L (A Minor) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, where it was felt that requiring a psychiatric report could ‘introduce 
an undesirable and unnecessary element into the prosecution process’ by shifting the 
court’s powers to others.134 As Otton LJ noted: ‘It is for the court to decide as a fact 
whether what the suspect did or said before or after the incident indicates his state 
of mind at the time of the offence and his appreciation of the seriousness of what he 
has done.’135 As such, expert opinion is just one piece of evidence to be assessed by 
the fact finder in the context of all other evidence that might be available. This is 
highlighted by R v EI.136 A psychiatrist had interviewed the boy and found that he 
could not understand the wrongfulness of what he had done. The trial judge weighed 
the psychiatrist’s evidence against other factors (such as evidence from lay 
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witnesses, the content of the police interview, and the circumstances surrounding the 
act) to conclude that the boy did have the requisite capacity.137 
When the court is weighing expert evidence it is important to be cognisant of 
the limitations of any such report. Some experts in the field acknowledge that 
psychometric measuring instruments are still inadequately developed to allow health 
professionals to complete their reports with clarity and precision.138 Unless this is 
made clear to the court, there is a danger that the court may overestimate the capacity 
of experts to determine a child’s understanding. 
A final point is that requiring expert evidence carries the danger of 
medicalising and pathologising the issue of criminal responsibility and making it 
appear that the fact finder is generally not in a position to assess the available 
evidence and lacks relevant experience. Thus, rather than routinely require expert 
testimony, the aim should be for the prosecution to gather as much evidence as is 
available from varied sources, in order to gain as full a picture as possible of the 
child’s capacities in relation to the conduct at issue, and for the court to ensure it 
balances any such reports against other available evidence.139 
F Home Background and School Life 
Home and school background profoundly affect a child’s ability to understand the 
wrongfulness of behaviour. In these environments, the child first learns the 
difference between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. If there are failings, 
particularly in the home, ‘what is more likely than that a child is brought up without 
knowledge of right and wrong?’140 Equally, evidence that a child is from a ‘good 
home’ and is well-educated can indicate that it is likely that he or she does have 
understanding of the wrongfulness of the act.141 
                                                 
137 Ibid [18]. 
138 Anthony L Pillay, ‘Criminal Capacity in Children Accused of Murder: Challenges in the Forensic 
Mental Health Assessment’ (2006) 18(1) Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health 17; 
Anthony L Pillay and Clive Willows, ‘Assessing the Criminal Capacity of Children: A Challenge to 
the Capacity of Mental Health Professionals’ (2015) 27(2) Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health 91; Skelton, above n 129. 
139 R v EI is an example of a case where the expert evidence that a child did not understand the 
wrongfulness of the act was rejected by the Court after balancing this evidence against the other 
available evidence: [2009] QCA 177 (19 June 2009). 
140 F v Padwick [1959] Crim LR 439 (Parker CJ), quoted in R v B (1979) 69 Cr App R 362, 365. Research 
clearly shows that there is a strong link between abuse, neglect and neurodevelopmental immaturity. 
See also Youth Justice Working Group, ‘Rules of Engagement: Changing the Heart of Youth Justice’ 
(Policy Report, The Centre for Social Justice, January 2012) 202 <http://www.centreforsocialjustice. 
org.uk/core/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CSJ_Youth_Justice_Full_Report.pdf>; Elly Farmer, ‘The 
Age of Criminal Responsibility: Developmental Science and Human Rights Perspectives’ (2011) 
6(2) Journal of Children’s Services 86, 88–9. 
141 See, eg, AL v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 34 (22 March 2017) [150]. This led to the criticism in  
C (A Minor) v DPP [1996] AC 1, 11 (Laws J) that the presumption is divisive and perverse:  
divisive, because it tends to attach criminal consequences to the acts of children coming from what 
used to be called good homes more readily than to the acts of others; perverse, because it tends to 
absolve from criminal responsibility the very children most likely to commit criminal acts. 
 In C (A Minor) v DPP Lowry J suggested that ‘[o]ne answer to this observation (not entirely 
satisfying, I agree) is that the presumption contemplated the conviction and punishment of children 
who, possibly by virtue of their superior upbringing, bore moral responsibility for their actions and 
358 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 40:339 
In M v J, a boy of 13 was charged with firearm offences for firing an air 
rifle.142 In that case, it was noted that ‘presumably the applicant knew that his father 
fired the air-rifle from time to time, assumed that it was not wrong for his father to 
do so, and probably assumed that it was not wrong for him to do so either’.143 In RP 
v The Queen, it was argued that an upbringing where there was exposure to violence 
could mean that the child did not think that the force he or she used was 
significant.144 This is in line with social learning theory, which explains ‘that 
maltreated children learn through modelling and reinforcement that aggressive 
behaviour is linked to more attention and status’.145 As noted already, the fact that 
RP knew about anal sex and used a condom were thought by the plurality of the 
High Court to suggest exposure to indecent material or abuse.146 This concern was 
reinforced by a psychiatrist’s report related to later offending that also raised the 
possibility that RP had been the victim of molestation and had been exposed to 
family violence and family disputes.147 The High Court noted that despite concerns 
being raised about the possibility of abuse, the prosecution did not call on the father 
or anyone else to give evidence about the environment in which RP was raised.148 
In contrast, in AL v The Queen evidence that the child had a good home life, 
lived with both parents and siblings in an affluent environment and had a good 
school record were regarded as sufficient, along with other evidence, to allow a jury 
to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the child understood the wrongfulness 
of his behaviour.149 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal found weight in the fact 
that the jury had evidence of the home background including ‘photographs of the 
applicant and his home from 2004’ from which it noted that: ‘Nothing in those 
images bespeaks disadvantage or deprivation; quite to the contrary.’150 Such 
evidence of the home background, while useful, must be balanced against other 
available evidence given that the inquiry is about whether the child understood the 
behaviour to be seriously wrong at the time and in the circumstances in which the 
offence was committed. 
Aside from expert evidence from psychologists and psychiatrists, several 
cases have accepted that evidence of a child’s understanding may come from 
someone who knows the child well, such as a schoolteacher, social worker or even 
a family member.151 In R v JA, a teacher gave evidence that concern had been 
expressed about the 11-year-old boy’s ‘problem behaviours’, especially ‘rough 
play’.152 This was taken to indicate that the boy did not understand that such 
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behaviour was wrong in the relevant sense.153 School reports also revealed that he 
was not ‘able to assess and apply adult standards’.154 In BP v The Queen, a teacher 
gave evidence that it was almost a daily occurrence that she would need to speak to 
the boy about his behaviour and explain to him that what he was doing was wrong 
or unacceptable. She noted that when being counselled about his behaviour he 
appeared to accept what he was told and appeared remorseful.155 By contrast, in AL 
v The Queen evidence from school reports that AL was well-mannered, cooperative 
and appeared to be a good student who complied with school rules was used to 
support the finding that AL did understand the wrongfulness of his behaviour.156 In 
drawing inferences from such reports and statements from teachers, as with reports 
of psychiatrists of psychologists, it must be remembered that unless specifically 
prepared about the offence committed, they will usually only indicate an opinion 
about the child’s general level of understanding or typical behaviours. As such, they 
may be of limited use in determining whether the child actually understood at the 
time and in the circumstances of the offence that his or her actions were wrong. Care 
must therefore be taken to ensure that this evidence is balanced with any other forms 
of evidence that may be more directly related to the commission of the offence. 
Some cases have questioned whether inferences could be drawn from the 
behaviour of the child and/or family in court. In Ex parte N, the appeals committee 
of Middlesex Sessions felt its conclusion that the boy had understood the 
wrongfulness of his act was ‘reinforced by the appearance and demeanour of the 
father and son in court: the boy appeared to be alert, to have good manners and to 
have a warm relationship with his father’.157 On appeal, the Divisional Court held 
that it was dangerous to deduce anything from this.158 Similarly, in the case of CC v 
Director of Public Prosecutions the fact that the boy’s mother was present in court 
supporting him was thought to be of little probative value.159 Clearly such factors 
say very little about whether the child understood the wrongfulness of the act at the 
time of committing it, because they mainly indicate how the parent values the court 
appearance.160 Where the trial takes place some time after the alleged offence, it is 
even more inappropriate to use the appearance and demeanour of the accused as 
indicative of their ability to understand the wrongfulness at the time they committed 
the offence. Therefore, the comment in R v JJ; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) that 
‘the jury were in a position to form their own impressions from having seen him 
giving evidence in the witness box even if many years after the event’161 is highly 
problematic. 
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G Previous Record 
There are strict rules in relation to the admission of records of past criminal 
convictions in trials involving adults. This makes the use of the past criminal record 
of the child controversial, because it can place a child in a worse position than an 
adult.162 While British courts struggled with establishing when it was appropriate to 
accept such evidence, Australian courts have tended to be more open to the reception 
of such evidence. It has been held that it is admissible to establish capacity, even 
though it would not be allowed under the similar fact rule and so would not be 
admitted in the case of an adult.163 This is thought acceptable because evidence of a 
previous finding of guilt is admitted only for the purpose of establishing whether the 
child knew the act was wrong, and not to establish commission of the crime.164 In 
GW v The Queen, it was noted that where there is a danger that the prosecution is 
seeking to lead evidence of a prior record or finding of guilt, the court can use s 136 
of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to avoid such prejudice and limit the evidence only 
to the issue of doli incapax.165 
It is evident that if the child has been found guilty of another similar offence, 
then he or she may well have come to understand that the behaviour was seriously 
wrong. This is also likely to be so where the child has been dealt with by the police, 
even if not found guilty. The usefulness of the record or finding of guilt is, however, 
dependant on whether the past criminal act was similar to the act under 
consideration. Evidence of a previous conviction says little if it is for a different type 
of offence. For instance, a conviction for assault does not mean that the child will 
understand the wrongfulness of an act of forgery. Furthermore, it is important to 
remember that there must be proof that the child understood the wrongfulness of the 
specific act committed at the time of committing it. While a previous finding of guilt 
may be highly suggestive of understanding, there may be evidence of other 
contextual factors which detract from this inference.  
H Statements by the Child to the Police 
Evidence of statements made by the child are particularly probative — in contrast to 
evidence inferred from factors such as the type of offence committed, the 
circumstances surrounding the offence, and the child’s upbringing. This type of 
evidence is preferable to inferential evidence because it comes directly from the 
child and refers directly to the child’s appreciation of the act. It is not drawn from a 
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general analysis of the behaviour and personality of the child, nor is it drawn 
indirectly from the act or generalised expectations about the understanding of 
children in general. 
There have been several cases where an admission by the child to the police 
that he or she knew that the act was wrong has been used to rebut the presumption. 
In JM (A Minor) v Runeckles,166 a 13-year-old girl attacked another girl and stabbed 
her with a broken milk bottle. Evidence of her understanding was taken from the fact 
that she clearly and coherently described what had happened when she gave a 
statement under caution to the police shortly after her arrest. However, the use of 
statements made by a child must be approached with caution. In IPH v Chief 
Constable of South Wales, a boy accused of criminal damage admitted that he 
foresaw that pushing a van against a post would result in damage.167 Lord Justice 
Woolf regarded this statement as showing that the boy knew the consequences of his 
act but not that he knew that his act was seriously wrong.168 
The methods used by police in conducting interviews with children have been 
the subject of discussion by academics and by the courts.169 In IPH v Chief Constable 
of South Wales, Woolf LJ suggested, that in order to gather evidence about a child’s 
understanding, the police should include some specifically formulated questions. His 
Lordship proposed direct questions, such as ‘[d]id you appreciate that what you were 
doing was seriously wrong?’170 However, it is preferable to avoid such ‘yes/no’ 
questions because a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ does not explain how the child regarded the act or 
show whether the child knew that the act was seriously wrong, as opposed to naughty 
or mischievous.171 R v EI provides an example of more useful interview questions.172 
Here the police officer put a number of hypothetical questions to the boy, asking 
whether what had occurred in each scenario presented was the right or wrong thing 
to do and why this was so.173 A psychiatrist who had interviewed the boy gave 
evidence that he thought the boy was giving answers that he thought the police were 
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expecting.174 Nonetheless, it was found that the boy’s answers contained some 
explanations indicating that he had an understanding of right and wrong and had the 
capacity at the time of the offence to know that he ought not to do acts of the kind 
involved in the offences.175 
Leading questions, such as ‘so you knew stealing it was wrong?’, can suggest 
the answer that the person questioning wishes to hear.176 Research shows that young 
people are more suggestible and compliant than adults, and more likely to make false 
confessions.177 There is, thus, the danger that a child may agree with a question and 
‘[i]n this set of circumstances suspects may appear to admit to the offence without 
accepting that they have done anything wrong’.178 This was an issue in R v 
McCormick,179 where a boy had been inside an aviary and, amongst other things, left 
a door open leading to some birds escaping and dying. The officer began the 
questioning by asking: ‘Did you know that it’s — it was seriously wrong to go into 
those aviaries?’180 District Court Judge Wilson felt that the child’s answers could 
not assist in determining whether he had the requisite capacity at the time of the 
offence because the proposition that his behaviour was wrong had already been put 
to him. Therefore, Wilson DCJ did not feel ‘confident that the child, having been 
alerted to what the policeman considers to be wrong, did not merely provide the 
answer that he believed would appease the officer’.181 
In contrast to those cases where the admission of an offence has been used to 
rebut the presumption are those cases where the requisite understanding was drawn 
from the fact that the child falsely denied committing the offence.182 In T v Director 
of Public Prosecutions,183 a child was questioned by the police about stealing a first 
aid kit from an ambulance. The fact that the child said ‘it ain’t nothing to do with 
me, I didn’t steal it’ was regarded as revealing that the child had a good level of 
understanding.184 Similarly, the child trying to disassociate himself or herself from 
the act and blame others may indicate that he or she appreciated the wrongfulness of 
the act and this was exactly why he or she tried to blame others.185 In the case of L v 
Director of Public Prosecutions,186 a child, upon being apprehended, denied having 
possession of a CS gas canister that he had been seen to throw down. It was held that 
the fact that ‘when confronted at the scene he told a deliberate and blatant lie’ could 
have been taken into account to establish the child’s understanding.187 However, 
whether the denial can be taken to suggest that a child understood the wrongfulness 
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of the act depends on the circumstances and the accusation that is being denied. In 
R v McCormick, the prosecution sought to rebut the presumption on the basis of a 
false denial when the boy answered ‘no’ to the question of ‘[d]o you realise you 
killed a lot of small birds?’188 District Court Judge Wilson rejected that this denial 
established sufficient understanding because the question related to whether the 
young person realised the existence of the state of things. There was evidence that 
he had been at the aviary with other boys, but there was no evidence that he had 
actually killed the birds. Furthermore, the fact that the boy made no reply to a similar 
question and looked shocked was taken by Wilson DCJ as signalling nothing more 
than that the boy was visibly affected by the realisation that his actions could have 
led to the death of the birds.189 
It is therefore vital that care is taken in how young people are questioned. It 
should also be remembered that the child must have known that the act was wrong 
at the time of committing it. For instance, in R v EI the psychiatrist found that the 
boy may have believed the behaviour to be wrong because the police officer told 
him or implied it was so.190 However, the psychiatrist found that the boy did not have 
any inner sense of why the behaviours were right or wrong and did not understand 
the implications of his behaviour for the victims.191 Thus, the possibility must be 
considered that the child did not appreciate the wrongfulness of the act at that time, 
but came to realise that it was seriously wrong as a direct result of being questioned 
by the police or other adults.192 On this point the usefulness of statements made at a 
much later date is doubtful. In AL v The Queen, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal 
accepted that a recollection by AL of his level of understanding at the age of 12, 
made during cross-examination between 11 and 13 years after the offence, was 
relevant and admissible to ascertaining whether he had understood the wrongfulness 
of his behaviour.193 This is troubling because it seems that this is not drawing on a 
memory about what he understood when he was 12 years old, but rather it is an 
expression of an opinion (which is generally not admissible) about what he might 
have understood back then.194 As the defence argued, AL was asked as a grown man 
to give an answer looking back to the relevant period, which does not provide 
evidence of his actual understanding at that time.195  
I Statements Made by the Child during or after the Offence 
Statements made during the commission of the crime can be indicative of the child’s 
understanding. In R v JA, an 11-year-old boy was charged with threatening actual 
bodily harm with the intent to engage in sexual intercourse and committing an act of 
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indecency on a 12-year-old girl.196 It was found that the language used to induce the 
girl to comply with his demands (‘talking about gangs, gang rules and killing his 
family’) revealed that he was acting out a fantasy, rather than appreciating that he 
was engaging in criminal activity.197 In contrast, in R v JJ; Ex parte Attorney-
General (Qld),198 a case involving a brother raping his sister, McPherson JA found 
that there was sufficient evidence of JJ’s understanding from the things he said to 
his victim. When his sister told him she was too young and that because he was her 
brother ‘you don’t do that to me’, he replied: ‘he could do this’ and told her not to 
‘tell Mum or Dad, or I’ll hurt you’.199 This uncontradicted evidence was taken to 
have been sufficient to satisfy a jury that the boy had the capacity to know he ought 
not to rape his sister.200 
Utterances made to others not in the context of questioning, but following the 
offence, may also be a useful source of evidence. In RH v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NSW),201 after breaking into a fire station and stealing property, RH 
went to his cousin’s house at night to tell him what he had done. He told his cousin, 
‘I got drinks and that here, I got them from the fire station, I broke in there, … I was 
searching looking for money. I found drinks and balloons and rulers. Me and S got 
“em”.’202 Chief Judge Hoeben found that these words had the character of boasting 
about what RH had done and that the actual words used, particularly in relation to 
breaking in and searching for money, made it clear that RH knew that what he was 
doing was seriously wrong and not acts of mischief.203 Such statements may be more 
reliable because they are not made in response to direct questioning by a person in a 
position of authority and, thus, the child is less likely to be led to give a certain 
answer. There is, however, the danger that such statements may amount to showing 
off to peers or others and not truly reflect an understanding of the wrongfulness of 
the act. 
IV Conclusion 
Despite its longevity, the presumption of doli incapax remains a relatively nebulous 
concept with a lack of clarity over how it is rebutted. Criticisms of the presumption 
have tended to stem from perceptions of how easy or difficult it is to rebut it. Some 
find that the presumption is too easily rebutted with little evidence and, as such, it 
provides little protection. Others consider that the rules around evidence are too rigid 
and make the presumption too protective of children. Much confusion and frustration 
seems to stem particularly from those cases where it is thought that the act was so 
obviously wrong that every normal child would understand this. From this follows 
the argument that it is absurd to require proof of understanding beyond making 
inferences from the evidence establishing commission of the offence. The High 
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Court in RP v The Queen has now brought some clarity about rebuttal of the 
presumption. It has confirmed the traditional position that evidence of the acts 
constituting the offence cannot alone be used to rebut the presumption. This is 
appropriate to ensure that adult judgements are not attributed to the child. It has also 
made clear that the prosecution has the onus of rebutting the presumption and must, 
therefore, gather sufficient evidence to support rebuttal, rather than merely relying 
on inferences and generalisations. This has the potential to increase criticism that the 
presumption is absurd in presuming children do not understand the wrongfulness of 
acts which are evidently wrong. 
This article should go some way to stemming such concerns by assessing the 
sort of evidence that is appropriate to rebut the presumption. As stated in AL v The 
Queen: ‘There is no prescribed formula for evidence sufficient to rebut the 
presumption; that will depend upon the circumstances in individual cases.’204 
However, this does not mean that there cannot be clarification of what forms of 
evidence should be relied on by the prosecution and how these different forms of 
evidence might interact with one another. It has been shown that the best approach 
is to collect as much evidence as possible, starting with the age of the child and the 
type of act committed. If the child is close to 14 years old and the act is obviously 
wrong, then it may take little further evidence to satisfy a court that the child 
understood the act to be seriously wrong. But where such inferences are drawn from 
the age and type of offence committed, other evidence should be called upon to 
confirm or reject the inferences. Information about the child’s mental and moral 
development may, for example, suggest that general assumptions should not be 
made. This was the case in RP v The Queen, where it was found that RP was in the 
borderline category of intellectual disability.205 Evidence of the child’s level of 
understanding generally (for example, from the home, school and social 
background) may also reveal whether the child was so developed that they should 
have been able to understand the wrongfulness of the act. Such evidence ought then 
to be assessed in the context of the concrete act (for example, what the child said 
and how they behaved before, during and after the act) to reveal whether, in the 
actual situation, the child understood that what they had done was seriously wrong. 
The more indicators that are assessed, the clearer the picture will be of a child’s 
understanding. When approached in this way, the presumption of doli incapax 
provides appropriate protection for children. It allows a child to be prosecuted when 
the prosecution can bring evidence that they understood the act to be seriously wrong 
as opposed to naughty or mischievous. Where such evidence is not forthcoming, the 
child should not be prosecuted. 
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